| “patriots” from Montenegro, Boka Kotorska and Tjentište. This document detailed the “collaboration and treachery” of General Draža Mihailović. For the first time, the Soviet media published such resolution. Previously Soviet newspapers described only the partisans fight and their military successes, but nothing was mentioned about the četniks and their “treacherious activities”18. The Yugoslav Royal Government officially protested to the Soviet ambassador in London. This diplomatic protest inspired the Soviet government to write the Memorandum handed to S. Simić, the Yugoslav ambassador in Kujbishew on August 3rd, 1942. Presenting this Memorandum, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs overtly uttered its opinion that General D. Mihailović had been a collaborator. The Memorandum provided the “facts”, received from Tito’s partisans, about Mihailović’s collaboration with the Germans and the Italians in Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro19. This announcement of the Soviet government indicates the recognition of its relationships with the CPY, on the one hand, and the changing relationships with the Yugoslav Royal government, on the other. The counter-Memorandum of the Yugoslav Royal government (August 12th, 1942) explained the četniks’ activities against the occupiers and tried to improve the deteriorating diplomatic relations with Moscow20. However, the Soviet government decided to rupture relations with officials of the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile.
In 1942, J. B. Tito requested permission from the Comintern to discredit publicly the Yugoslav government-in-exile and its protege in Yugoslavia – General D. Mihailović. Tito’s final intention was to receive international support in order to replace Yugoslav Royal government in London as the representative of the Yugoslav people. The leader of the Yugoslav partisans had been a waiting the reply from Moscow during the whole of 1942 and 1943. Nevertheless, in the meantime, a favourable moment for public dissmis of General D. Mihailović and his proponents in London did not occur. Ultimately, Tito decided to make use of the meeting of the “big-three” at the Teheran conference for his political aim to present himself and his partisan movement as the real and moral representatives of the Yugoslavs. Tito organized the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (the ACNLY) in the Bosnian town Jajce (November 29th–30th, 1943), exactly coinciding with the sessions of the Teheran conference. The ACNLY, when it was formed in November 1942 in the Bosnian town of Bihaę, did not have any prerogatives of a supreme organ of government because of foreign policy considerations. But, one year later, conditions were changed and the second session of the ACNLY adopted far reaching decisions connected with the establishment of the new (socialist) Yugoslavia. The deputies of the ACNLY decided to create the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia (the NCLY) which would play the role of new Yugoslav government. At the same time, the ACNLY was transformed into the people’s assembly. The return of the Yugoslav king and Royal Karadjordjević dynasty to Yugoslavia was forbidden until the war was over. The question of the political structure of the state (republic or monarchy) was supposed to be discussed after the liberation. The federal
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18 Труд. Москва, яанварь 12 1942; Большевик. Москва, 1942. T. 2; Красная звезда. Москва, июнь 12 1942; Правда. Москва, июль 19 1942; Л. Я. Гибианский. Советский Союз и новая Югославия 1941–1947 г. г. Москва, 1987. С. 49.
19 B. Krizman (urednik). Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1941–1943. Dokumenti. Beograd–Zagreb, 1981. S. 334–335.
20 J. Marjanović. Draža Mihailovię izmedju Britanaca i Nemaca. Beograd, 1979. S. 278. |
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