The Victory of the Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia and Moscow

The Second Session of the ACNLY held in the Bosnian town Jajce (November 29^th–30^th, 1943) showed overtly that socialist transformation of Yugoslav society was the main aim of the CPY and its fight against the occupiers. The conclusions of this session were used by Moscow for its own political purpose in relations with its western allies and the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Moscow refused to sign the Yugoslav-Soviet pact of friendship and co-operation proposed by Yugoslav Prime Minister Božidar Purić on December 22^nd, 1943 with the explanation that the Soviet government did not see any possibility for negotiations with the Yugoslav Royal government because of the “totally confused, unclear and unresolved situation in Yugoslavia”. However, real reason for such a Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav government-in-exile was Moscow’s intention to recognise Tito’s government, established in Jajce, as the only legal government of Yugoslavia. For the same reason Moscow rejected the British initiative that the USSR and the UK should pursue a common policy toward Yugoslavia. The Soviet government recognised the changes in the political organisation of Yugoslav society in the case of communist victory during the war with a public proclamation of all decisions of the Second Session of the ACNLY via the Free Yugoslavia radio station located in Moscow and controlled by the Comintern and the Soviet government. At that time, Ralph Stevenson, the new British ambassador at the Yugoslav court, observed that it was not possible to think that the Soviet government could allow anything to be proclaimed on the radio station Free Yugoslavia that was not in acordance with Soviet policy⁴².

British policy toward Yugoslavia during the war was to help the Yugoslav king, Petar II Karadjordjević to return to his country in order to combine the partisan and četnik movement. The leadership of these united forces would be shared between Tito and the king. This was proposed by Churchill in a letter sent to Tito on February 5^th, 1944⁴³. This proposal Tito delivered to G. Dimitrov in order to get a piece of advice from Moscow. Tito received Dimitrov’s answer on February 8^th, 1944 with the Soviet decisions: 1) the Yugoslav government-in-exile had to be dismissed together with General Mihailović; 2) the Yugoslav government in the country (the National Committee for Liberation of Yugoslavia) should be recognised by the British government and other members of the Alliance as the only Yugoslav government; 3) the Yugoslav king had to be subordinated to the laws issued by the ACNLY and 4) cooperation with the king would be possible only if Petar II would recognise all decisions proclaimed by the ACNLY in Jajce⁴⁴.

The Soviet government recognised the NCLY as the only legal Yugoslav government in May 1944 with the signing of the first financial contract with the NCLY’s mission in Moscow. It was the first international contract which was signed between the NCLY and a foreign government. This contract was a result of the new Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia which was quite different from Moscow’s attitude toward the Yugoslav political and military situation at the beginning of the war.

Soviet diplomacy during the autumn and winter of 1941 required that Tito cooperate

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42 D. Biber (urednik). Tito – Churchill. Strogo tajno. Beograd-Zagreb, 1981. S. 67.

43 Ibid., s. 83–84.

44 M. Dželebdžić (urednik). Dokumenti centralnih organa KPJ, NOR i revolucija (1941–1945). Beograd, 1986. T. XV, s. 449.