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Girius MERKYS
 
  Archyvai (10 Volume)  
   
 
ISSN 1392-0448. LIETUVOS ISTORIJOS STUDIJOS. Nr. 10
Acting in this way, the USSR recognised de facto the occupation and partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by Italy, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. However, in July 1941 the Soviet Union restored diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav Royal Government in London. Consequently, it was beneficial for Moscow to have double relations with Yugoslavia: one was public and legal (with the Yugoslav government in London) and the other one was secret and nonofficial (with the CPY as one of sections of the Comintern). Soviet historiography claimed that the Comintern, as an international organisation, was independent (did not work under orders from the Soviet government). However, Yugoslav historiography disagrees with this opinion. It stresses the fact that the Comintern was located in the Soviet Union which was dominated by Stalin and that the Comintern was an “extended hand” of the official Soviet government. Yugoslav historians have concluded that the policy of the Comintern was precisely the policy of the Soviet government.

Moscow interferd and supported any resistance movement in Europe which could weaken German military pressure on the Eastern front, and bring advantage to the military situation of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Balkans, Yugoslavia and the CPY, were seriously taken into consideration by Stalin, the Comintern and the Soviet government. The Soviet Union’s policy, based on Stalin’s desires, to destroy the Kingdom of Yugoslavia because being a member of the “Versailles system” Yugoslavia maintained to stop Soviet influence in Europe. Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia was carried out through the Comintern, in fact through the CPY as member of Comintern7. The Comintern required from the other communist parties to undertake all measures necessary in order to weaken the Nazis’ attacks on the Soviet Union. It was implicitly emphasized immediately after the outbreak of “Barbarosa” in June 22nd, 1941 when the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent a message to the Central Committee of the CPY informing it that the defence of the Soviet Union was the responsibility of the other enslaved nations and their leaders – the Communist parties. The Comintern required that during the war any local contradictions and conflicts be postponed and replaced with the fight against Fascism8. This Comintern demand implied that the CPY should temporarily halt the call for class struggle and unite all forces for the fight against Nacizm and Fascism9.

I would argue, on the basis of historical sources, that the uprising in Yugoslavia, organised by the CPY in the summer of 1941, was ordered by the Comintern (the Soviet government behind it) to reduce Nazi military pressure on the Eastern front. This was manifested in a telegram of the Comintern sent to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia at the end of July 1941. This telegram answered Kopinič’s reports to Moscow about the situation within the Communist Party of Croatia. The Comintern stated that all members of the CPY were obliged to join the army, to defend the Soviet Union if it would be necessary and to give their lives for “the freedom of the Soviet Union”. Every member of the party was expected to be a soldier of the Red Army10.

 

 

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7 V. Vinaver. Ugrožavanje Jugoslavije 1919–1932 // Vojno-istorijski glasnik. Beograd, 1968. S. 150.

8 B. Petranović. Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988. Beograd, 1988. T. II, s. 78–79.

9 R. Bulat (urednik). Ostrožinski Pravilnik 14. XII 1941. Historijski Arhiv u Karlovcu-Skupština Općine Vrginmost. Zagreb, 1990; V. Dedijer, I. Božić, S. Ćirković, M. Ekmečić. Istorija Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1973. S. 474.

10 N. Popović. Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945). Beograd, 1988. S. 55.

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