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Girius MERKYS
 
  Archyvai (10 Volume)  
   
 
ISSN 1392-0448. LIETUVOS ISTORIJOS STUDIJOS. Nr. 10
Šubašić a agreement” required: 1) federal organisation of the future Yugoslavia; 2) recognition of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (led by Tito) by the Yugoslav Royal government; 3) that the NCLY and Yugoslav government in London would create a common Yugoslav government; 4) all anti-fascist fighting forces in Yugoslavia would be united with the NLAY and 5) that the question of monarchy in Yugoslavia would be re solved after the war45. The Tito- Šubašić agreement gave official sanction to the ACNLY’s decisions and further consolidated the international position of the NLMY. This agreement was signed in full accordance with Soviet policy and diplomatic tactics. Formally, the Soviet government cooperated with the western members of the Alliance but in reality Moscow supported Tito in his fight to take a power in Yugoslavia. The Soviet press was overwhelmingly on Tito’s side in 1944 and 1945, charging Mihailović’s četniks with collaboration. Indirectly, Moscow charged the Yugoslav government-in-exile with the same collaborations with the Germans because General Mihailović was under its protection.

Finally, a turning point in relations between the Soviet government and the CPY occurred in September 1944 when Tito for the first time during the war visited Moscow. In three meetings with Stalin (September 21st–28th) Tito made a deal with the Soviet leader to send the Red Army across the Danube in order to support Tito’s partisans to take the Yugoslav capital before Mihailović’s četniks would do so46. Likewise, Soviet troops were allowed to operate against the Germans in a limited part of Yugoslav territory. Officially, the Soviet government asked Tito for permission to cross the Danube and to enter Yugoslav territory. This Soviet “application” was interpreted by the Americans and the British as the Soviet de facto recognition the NCLY as the legal Yugoslav government. The NCLY’s prohibition of the British navy to use Yugoslav sea ports became a part of the Tito-Stalin agreement. With full Soviet military support Tito’s partisans conquered Belgrade on October 20th, 1944. The Yugoslav Royal government and its exponent in the country, General D. Mihailović lost the civil war against Tito. To conclude, the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia achieved a victory through extensive coordination between Tito’s communists and the Soviet government.

British diplomacy tried at the last moment to save what could be saved in the Balkans by dirrect negotiations with the Soviet government. For that purpose, the British Premier went to Moscow in October 1944 and had a meeting with the Soviet leader. On this occasion Stalin and Churchill decided on a division of spheres of interests (in percentage) in Southeastern Europe: in Yugoslavia and Hungary 50:50, in Rumania 90 for the Soviets, in Bulgaria 75 for the Soviets and finally in Greece 90 for Great Britain. Without any doubt an important consideration for London in granting such concessions to Moscow was the Soviet penetration into the eastern portion of the Balkans and the real possibility that the Red Army would move rapidly into Central Europe. Thus the question of Yugoslavia became once again very important in the minds of the creators of the postwar division of spheres of influence. At first sight it looked like Churchill lost the batlle over Yugoslavia with Stalin as immediatelly after the war Tito followed Stalin’s policy of incorporation of the new Yugoslavia into the Soviet block. Even in March 1945 Churchill complained in vain to Stalin that

 

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45 J. B. Tito. Jugoslavija u borbi za nezavisnost i nesvrstanost. Sarajevo, 1977. S. 114–122; E. Kardelj. Sećanja. Beograd, 1980. S. 59–61.

46 V. Strugar. Jugoslavija 1941–1945. Beograd, 1969. S. 265–268.

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