| In the first, the chief conclusion is that Tito’s partisan movement was independent, in other words, not under the supervision of Moscow. The CPY and its partisans were not a “prolonged hand” of Stalin and they did not pursue the Soviet policy of spreading the socialist revolution around the world. Besides, Yugoslav historiography pointed out that the military help of the USSR given in autumn 1944 to Tito’s partisans was not the decisive factor which crucially helped the CPY to take political power in Yugoslavia. The main proponent of this view is Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) himself, whose war memoirs, published in his Sabrana djela, (All Works, Belgrade, 1979), has the main aim of showing Tito’s independence from Stalin. The best representatives of such an attitude in Yugoslav historiography are: Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1988, (History of Yugoslavia 1918–1988) second volume, Belgrade, 1988; Miodrag Zečevię, Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Ju˛noslovenski dr˛avni san i java (Yugoslavia 1918–1992. South-Slavic state dream and reality), Belgrade, 1993, and Vladimir Velebit, Sjeęanja (Memoars), Zagreb, 1983.
As opposed to Yugoslav historiography the most common Soviet and popular version of those relations hold that the CPY during the whole war strongly depended on Moscow. The actions of Yugoslav communists were directed by Stalin in order to carry out his policy of “world socialist revolution.” According to this historiography, it was only Soviet military help given to Tito in October 1944 which enabled him to win political power over all of Yugoslavia. One of the main defects in both of these historiographies is that they minimised the role of the Yugoslav Royal government-in-exile, and of US and British diplomacy in relations between Tito and the Soviet Union during the Second World War. This defect was only partially overcome in the book: Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945), (Yugoslav-Soviet Relations during the Second World War (1941–1945) Belgrade, 1988, written by Nikola B. Popovię.
In this essay I will undertake an analysis to explore relations between Yugoslav communists and the Soviet Union in the years 1941–1945 setting out three new hypotheses which are based on Yugoslav and Soviet historical sources from the Second World War. Firstly, the communist uprising in Yugoslavia in 1941 was ordered by the Comintern and organised in favour of the Soviet Union. This hypothesis derives from the view that Tito was sent from Moscow in 1937 to Yugoslavia as a new General Secretary of the CPY with the purpose of preparing the party for taking power in Yugoslavia with Soviet help. This was to be carried out under the pretext of resisting the occupiers. The actual goal was to carry out Stalin’s policy of spreading Soviet influence in Central-Southeastern Europe under the pretext of “people” (socialist) revolution. The final result of Stalin’s policy was to be the Pax Sovietica within the eastern portion of Europe. Secondly, Tito’s partisan movement was infact independent from Moscow far until 1944 as material and military support is pointed. I came to the conclusion that there were two reasons for this: 1) Stalin could not give real military support to Tito before 1944 because of his relations with the UK and the USA and 2) only in 1944 the appropriate transport conditions for Soviet support delivered to Tito were established. However, as will become evident, Tito was receiving overwhelming material support from Moscow in 1944 and 1945 in what turned out to be the crucial situation of conquering Belgrade in October 1944 and after that to take political power in all of Yugoslavia. Thirdly, the main character and aim of |
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