| structure of the future Yugoslavia was proclaimed in advance. The federal internal structure of Yugoslavia, instead of centralist model, was propagated by Yugoslav communists even before the war broke out. For Yugoslav communists, federalisation of the country was designed from 1937 onward as one of the crucial achievements of socialism. They took the Soviet Union’s federal model of internal state organisation as an example for the federal organisation of socialist Yugoslavia21. For Yugoslav communists, a federal organisation of Yugoslavia was a cornerstone of a new union of liberated nations22.
While Moscow disapproved the creation of the ACNLY (November 26th–27th, 1942) because of possible negative reactions from the Anglo-American side23, a convocation and the legislative work of the second session of the ACNLY a year later were supported by Moscow24. From the very beginning of the war J. B. Tito strongly insisted that the Soviet government would recognise the partisan units in Yugoslavia as the regular army of all Yugoslav nations. In Tito’s mind this recognition was supposed to be followed by a Soviet military mission sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans’ National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia25. Tito’s main diplomatic goal in the autumn of 1943 was to obtain from Moscow public recognition of the alliance between the Soviet government and the CPY.
To be sure, according to relevant historical sources, Tito utilised the preparation for the Ministerial Conference in Moscow between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (held from October 19th to October 30th, 1943) to present his war aims in Yugoslavia to the Soviet government. The leader of the Yugoslav partisans sent a message to G. Dimitrov (October 1st, 1943) informing the Soviet government that: 1) the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement recognises neither the Yugoslav Royal government in London nor the Yugoslav king because they supported D. Mihailović– “a collaborator and traitor of the Yugoslav nation”; 2) the National Liberation Movement would not allow Yugoslav government-in-exile and Yugoslav king to return to Yugoslavia because their arrival in Yugoslavia could give rise to civil war in the country; and 3) “the sole legitimate government at the present time is represented by the national liberation committees, headed by the Anti-Fascist Council” 26. Tito in the same telegram presented his main revolutionary (socialist) claims to the Comintern as well. The message influenced the Soviet government and during the Moscow Ministerial Conference Soviet foreign minister Molotov demanded from the USA and the UK two approvals: 1) to send a Soviet military mission to the Supreme Headquarters of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia and 2) to establish military base in the Middle East in order to supply war materials to Tito’s partisans27.
Tito’s telegram, sent to Dimitrov, proves for me at last that the Soviet government was well acquainted with the revolutionary aims of the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. In the autumn of 1943 Moscow recognised
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21 B. Petranović, M. Zečević. Agonija dve Jugoslavije. Beograd, 1991. S. 45.
22 E. Kardelj. Sećanja. Beograd, 1980. S. 42–43.
23 V. Dedijer. Interesne sfere. Beograd, 1980. S. 352.
24 N. Popović. Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945). Beograd, 1988. S. 108.
25 J. B. Tito. Sabrana djela. Beograd, 1979. T. XVI, s. 153.
26 V. Dedijer. Interesne sfere. Beograd, 1980, s. 312.
27 B. Petranović (urednik). Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu 1943–1945. Dokumenti. Beograd–Zagreb, 1981. S. 291. | 
dizainas ir programavimas giriaus