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Girius MERKYS
 
  Archyvai (10 Volume)  
   
 
ISSN 1392-0448. LIETUVOS ISTORIJOS STUDIJOS. Nr. 10
In the Announcement to the Montenegrin people at the end of June 1941 issued by the Provincial Committee of the CPY for Montenegro, Sand˛ak and Boka Kotorska it was written that “the biggest guarantee for success for national freedom in the fight against the occupiers is the powerful and almighty Red Army and the revolutionary forces of the international proletariat”11 The Comintern, during this period of the war, even required from Yugoslav partisans that they collaborate with Mihailovię’s royal četnik forces in order to be able to fight the Germans12. Thus, Tito attempted to enlist cooperation of the četniks under Colonel (later General) Dra˛a Mihailovię who was located in a nearby part of Serbia in joint fighting against the enemy. However, the četniks supported by the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in London and the UK went back on their word and even attacked the partisan detachments during the German offensive against the liberated territory in November and December 1941.

The British strategy concerning Yugoslav affairs (i. e. the civil war) was to give support to that movement that would ensure restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after the war. The enigma, which liberation movement official London would support, was resolved in the autumn of 1941 when Great Britain was beginning to send military missions to the četnik high command. Not a single British or Soviet mission at that time was sent to the Supreme Headquarters of the partisan detachments13. Nevertheless, the British attitude about the Yugoslav civil war (i. e. the struggle between the partisans and the četniks) changed after the Soviet victory over the Germans in the Stalingrad battle early 1943. As it became clear for London that after Stalingrad the Red Army would drive further toward Central Europe and the Balkans, the British government decided to make direct contacts with Tito in order to increase its own and decrease Soviet influence among Yugoslav partisans. The purpose of this revised British policy in Yugoslavia was not to allow Moscow to establish its full domination over postwar Yugoslavia. Consequently, in April 1943 the first British mission was sent to the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (the NLAY), but afterwards they continued to arrive regularily and included even American military officers. The competition over Yugoslavia among the allies continued in early 1944 when the Soviet Union also sent a military mission to Tito14.

 

Moscow and the Question of Socialist Transformation of Yugoslav Society

The intention of the Yugoslav communists to achieve a social transformation of Yugoslav society as their final goal in the war in Yugoslavia (1941–1945), was stimulated by Stalin’s speech on November 7th, 1941, when he predicted the end of the war the following year. Stalin’s statement was instigated by successful Soviet counterattack in the battleground of Moscow.

Tito considered Stalin’s speech to be a signal to prepare the CPY for taking power in Yugoslavia before the end of the war. However, Tito’s partisans faced defeat by the German Nazis in Western Serbia in December 1941, which postponed achievement of his

 

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11 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije. Borbe u Crnoj Gori 1941. Vojno-istorijski institut jugoslovenske armije. Beograd, 1950. T. III/1, s. 14.

12 M. Zečević. Jugoslavija 1918–1992. Južnoslovenski državni san i java. Beograd, 1993. S. 105.

13 E. Kardelj. Sećanja. Beograd, 1980. S. 25–40.

14 Ibid., s. 50–54.

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