| to established Soviet foreign policy in the 1920s and implemented by the Commintern in the 1930s. This Soviet policy of domination would ensure the obedience of communist parties in other countries and more importantly to exert direct Soviet influence over foreign and domestic affairs of those countries under communist leadership, by their incorporation into Moscow’s political system of a Pax Sovietica Commonwealth. According to Stalin’s conception of postwar Europe, Yugoslavia would become one link in a Soviet chain composed of Central and Southeastern European socialist countries.
The četnik movement, led by General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, was the source of the main discord in relationships between the Soviet government and the Yugoslav government-in-exile supported by the British government. In these relations, a distinctive turning point occurred in December 1942 when Moscow overtly required from London that it influence the Yugoslav Royal government to change its policy toward the četnik movement.
The crucial support which during the entire war the CPY obtained from outside Yugoslavia was that which it received from Moscow. That was the principal reason that the Yugoslav civil war was resolved in the favour of Tito’s Yugoslav communists. Finally, this policy of Moscow towards Tito’s partisans ultimately benefited the USSR in fixing the Central and Southeastern European borderlands of Pax Sovietica on the eastern littoral of the Adriatic and the eastern Alps. Consequently, “the bridge” connecting Europe and Asia was immediately after the Second World War divided between “Eastern” and “Western” political-military blocks since the major portions of the Balkans and Southeastern Europe were left under Soviet control while Asia Minor and Greece were dominated by the western alliance. Furthermore, historical Central Europe was also divided between the Soviets and the Westerners in East Central Europe and West Central Europe. And finally, the political, military and economic division of Europe – Pax Sovietica and Pax Occidentalica – was sanctioned by the “big three” at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. In conclusion, it is obvious that during the Second World War the allied plans were not as concerned with the contribution made by resistance movements to the overall war effort as with the political importance such movements might acquire, to the detriment of the interests of some of the Great Powes and their agreements. The fighting for the liberation of the Yugoslav people from 1941 to 1945, and the politics of the allies, especially of the USSR, regarding this resistance serve as an ample illustration. |
dizainas ir programavimas giriaus